other proponents of political constitutionalism, I would find such a conclusion disturbing given that our objections to legal constitutionalism arise not from opposition to human rights 
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. 11 The Liberal Democrats opposed any change. The coalition agreement now pledges to explore a British Bill of Rights -previously code for strengthening the guarantees of Parliamentary sovereignty and , it is now thought if it happens at all it would be ECHR plus rather than minus. The coalition agreement also modifies the Conservative proposal for a Sovereignty Bill to an exploration of its possibility. For details see 'The Coalition: Our Programme for Government', sections 3 and 13 at http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/409088/pfg_coalition.pdf 12 but because we regard political means as offering securer safeguards for them. Consequently, it ought to be possible to reconcile political constitutionalism with something like the HRA's attempt to enumerate them in an ordinary statute and offer qualified protection by the courts.
I should note that some have seen the HRA and parallel developments in other commonwealth countries as giving rise to a new model of constitutionalism that balances legal and political constitutionalism in a novel way that offers an alternative to both. 13 By contrast, I believe it is more accurate to say that just as different forms of legal constitutionalism give greater or lesser weight to the legislature and popular sovereignty in amending or deciding constitutional questions, so different forms of political constitutionalism have allowed greater or lesser degrees of judicial independence and discretion. Both kinds of constitutionalism allow for some balance and there is nothing new in that. 14 The crux is where supremacy lies -with the legislature, as political constitutionalists desire, or the judiciary, as legal constitutionalists wish, and how far does that make judicial deference to Parliament a central feature of how judges conceive of their role. On this account, therefore, the crucial test with regard to the HRA from a political constitutionalist perspective is whether or not it renders legislative supremacy redundant.
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My central claim is that it need not do so.
I start with a brief outline of political constitutionalism. Subsequent sections then argue that the HRA need not, as a matter of either logical or practical necessity, replace it with legal constitutionalism -indeed, it potentially buttresses the role of Parliament. First, the HRA brings 'rights home', strengthening in certain respects domestic rights instruments vis-à-vis the ECHR. Second, sections 19 and 4 of the Act maintain and even enhance Parliament's scrutiny of rights and its sovereignty over the courts in defining and upholding them. Finally, section 3 and rights-based judicial review more generally can be assimilated to a system of 'weak' review whereby courts defer to the legislative 'scope' determined by Parliament and are restricted in their independent determinations to the judicial `sphere' of the fair conduct of the case at hand. Such 'weak review' has always been necessary. they might be best secured; how they might be set and balanced against each other; and so on.
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Second, as a result political constitutionalists maintain there can be no `higher', rights-based constitutional law that sits 'above' or 'beyond' politics. We necessarily frame and apply rights-based judgments within the 'circumstances of politics'. We may need rights to coordinate our collective behaviour and offer forms of protection to individuals and groups from the uncertainties and injustices that arise within social life, yet we differ considerably over what the most appropriate system of rights might be. So any system of rights has to be politically negotiated and will be the product of the institutional arrangements that exist to arbitrate these debates.
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Third, and as a consequence of these first two points, they contend judicial review is politics by legal means. Within the UK, a prime influence on the development of what might be called 'strong' legal constitutionalism has been the work of Ronald Dworkin and his followers. 22 Political constitutionalists have been particularly critical of the Dworkinian account of courts as a forum of principle, developing the critiques of those who have challenged the policy/principle distinction on which this thesis relies. They have also criticised Dworkin's claim that there is a 'right' answer as a matter of law in 'hard cases' and his apparent inability to distinguish invocations of morality that are supposed to be legally binding from those that are simply cases of judges exercising discretion. 23 By contrast, political constitutionalists can be broadly placed within the fold of legal positivism.
Obviously, it is possible to be a legal positivist and still advocate a form of legal constitutionalism. However, political constitutionalists, as Jeremy Waldron has noted, 24 give the legal positivist's focus on the institutional sources of law an important twist. For them, the democratic provenance of a law forms an essential feature of its political legitimacy.
Unlike Hobbes, for whom the kind of authority he associated with sovereignty defines law regardless of who that sovereign might be, the political constitutionalist believes that law- people, not simply an arcane endeavour of the legal profession. For a democrat, the criteria of legal validity need to be understandable by the citizens whose property the law is. This concern applies particularly to the notion of judge made law -not least because of potential mystifications that arise when the law seems to be a creature of judicial discretion and gets defined through judges exercising their private judgments about the merits of particular cases rather than via settled parliamentary processes.
Fourth, political constitutionalists regard courts as being both less legitimate and less effective mechanisms than legislatures within working democracies, such as the UK, for reasoning about the most appropriate constitutional scheme of rights. They insist that it is important to ensure not only that the outcomes of any decision procedure embody the equal concern and respect for all individuals as autonomous agents that motivates contemporary theories of rights, but also that the process whereby such decisions get made exemplifies such a commitment to the equal status of citizens. Indeed, they are inclined to believe that only such an equality regarding process will secure appropriately equitable outcomes -or could legitimately resolve disagreements about what such an outcome (or process) could be. When it comes to both process and outcome, they claim democratic legislatures prove superior to courts. Two features figure particularly strongly in the comparisons political constitutionalists draw between the two: the deliberative qualities of legislatures compared to courts, and the accountability of legislators to citizens. In both cases, political constitutionalists challenge the legal constitutionalist's claims that the legal context and independence of courts are advantages rather than disadvantages for fair and impartial reasoning about rights. 26 On the one hand, they argue that the need for courts to accommodate both extant law and to consider only those parties with legal standing in the particular case, tends to make them less apt than legislatures to take into consideration all the moral and practical considerations relevant for collective decisions. On the other hand, they see the electoral accountability of legislators as giving citizens political equality as autonomous reasoners and sources of information about 34 YOUNG supra note 7 offers a doctrinal analysis of parliamentary sovereignty that she believes renders it consistent with entrenchment of the HRA. As becomes clear in the second part of her book, this argument is then placed at the service of a 'dialogic' model of human rights review that places courts and the legislature on an equal basis. Whatever the merits of Young's reading of parliamentary sovereignty in its own terms, it is incompatible with the account of political constitutionalism given here which requires legislative supremacy.
Therefore, in what follows I shall take parliamentary sovereignty as precluding such entrenchment.
they also fail to motivate citizens and legislators to look at rights in the round, as part of a programme of government that takes into account the full range of preferences on a given issue and the way it relates to other important issues. That purpose is best achieved via a system of representative democracy where all citizens can participate as equals in public processes that select and can hold accountable the prime power holders. As a result, the key decision-makers have incentives to treat the views and concerns of those who elect them with equal concern and respect. The claim of political constitutionalism is that parliamentary democracy possesses constitutional qualities that make the fear of a populist government giving rise to a tyrannous majority highly tendentious. The objection to judicial review is at its heart an objection to the lack of such constitutional qualities within legal Convention rights within their jurisdictions, it does not specify how this might best be done.
The primary domestic mechanism need not be judicial -indeed, was not in either the UK or several Nordic countries for over 50 years. Of course, it might be argued that the ECHR itself undermines the political constitutionalist position, with the HRA simply building on that concession. However, formally the Convention is an international agreement between sovereign states from which they can withdraw or could potentially seek to renegotiate, as has periodically occurred when adding protocols or changing the composition and working of the ECtHR. This status has also allowed the UK not to sign up to all protocols to the Convention and to hold reservations with regard to particular Articles. Few would deny that withdrawal from the ECHR would have such grave consequences as to be highly unlikelyadversely affecting the UK's international standing and moral legitimacy and arguably involving leaving the EU as well, for which adherence to the ECHR is a requirement. But although those advocating this position tend to be on the margins of British political life, the constraints on parliamentary sovereignty are political not legal and such as to leave the first criterion identified above intact. 39 So the second criterion is also met.
Nevertheless, despite compliance of the ECHR regime with parliamentary sovereignty, there is no denying that the growing number of cases against the UK being brought before the ECtHR was felt to be an embarrassment that the HRA was in part designed to rectify. In this regard, many viewed the HRA as reinforcing political constitutionalism. The HRA would 'bring rights home' by offering domestic remedies that would reduce the need for recourse to the ECtHR. 40 The decisions of a domestic court would be both less embarrassing than adverse judgments by a 'foreign' court and, most important, more in tune with the particular circumstances and traditions of the UK, including its political constitution. Certainly, there is good reason to believe that a national court will be more although they now seek to do this via a referenda on any further expansion of EU competencies, and to strengthen the power of UK courts and Parliament to challenge both ECJ subject to indirect domestic democratic pressures than an international court is likely to be.
Even if formally independent, national courts form part of the domestic political system.
Their membership draws on the same broad 'political class' as national politicians -a significant number of whom may even have practiced law alongside them, and the selection of judges is subject to various forms of direct or indirect political control and influence.
Moreover, a far thicker public sphere exists at the national compared to the international level. Consequently, domestic courts come under greater scrutiny by the media and a broad range of interest groups, and so are more aware of public opinion than international courts.
As a result, they tend to feel more obliged than their international counterparts to legitimise themselves and gain acceptance for their decisions among the wider public. As research on the US Supreme Court indicates, courts follow the polls -or at least sustained, national electoral trends.
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That said, the ECtHR continues to cast its shadow over the HRA. In particular, Strasbourg also creates a potential break on their judicial activism and has arguably encouraged them to develop a domestic deference principle giving Parliament lee way as to how it might secure a given right. Though some argue such deference hinders the development of distinctive British human rights jurisprudence, 45 to a degree that can reinforce political constitutionalism.
However, even where the court does not go beyond the UK's commitments under the ECHR, its role is to make that commitment more present and continuous. As we shall see, a key issue has been the recognition, in part mandated by a Strasbourg decision, 46 that proportionality rather than a looser norm of reasonableness now be applied when Convention rights are at stake. 47 Meanwhile, the court has acknowledged that not all ECtHR jurisprudence necessarily applies to the UK, having been formulated with regard to cases involving circumstances that do not obtain in Britain, or is always sufficiently clear or wellreasoned as to be followable. 48 There are also cases where as yet there is no relevant Strasbourg case law. For the reasons noted above, it may still remain not just symbolically or formally but also in many ways substantively more in line with political constitutionalism for such judgments to be made by a domestic rather than an international court. Even in cases where the court sees itself as doing no more than acting as Strasbourg would at one remove, it will be doing so as the agent of a UK political order and be subject to the pressures from Parliament and British public opinion from which, to a large extent, it derives its authority and legitimacy. 49 And when it acts in cases where Strasbourg either has yet to go or has done so in ways that seem unclear or inappropriate, the court can give a steer that reflects the British context, including those circumstances that reflect its distinctive political processes. Convention rights, a power that has been employed only once thus far. 63 Section 4 was heralded as a core provision of the HRA. It was seen by many advocates of the measure as inaugurating a new model of judicial review that lay mid-way between political and legal constitutionalism. 64 However, others -both legal and political constitutionalists -have argued that in practice there is little difference between 'weak' and 'strong' judicial review -indeed, that the former is a chimera. 65 They note that so far Parliament has always complied with such rulings and amended the offending legislation accordingly. The key point, though, is why. Four sets of reasons have been given, none of which is inherently incompatible with political constitutionalism.
The first is that Parliament has exercised its prerogative. That it does so only rarely is neither here nor there, it remains its to exercise. 66 Indeed, if one takes the highest profile instance of a declaration of incompatibility, that of Belmarsh Prison, 67 Parliament can hardly be regarded as supinely accepting the court's decision. Though it granted the court's judgment that the current detention scheme involved unreasonable discrimination against non-UK citizens, it took several months to respond, adopting the new control order scheme following one of the longest ever Parliamentary debates. Meanwhile, the prisoners were only released once the new legislation was enacted so that they could be immediately re-arrested.
Rightly or wrongly, Parliament can hardly be viewed as conceding judicial supremacy, therefore.
A second reason is political culture -that any government would simply find it politically inexpedient to go against such a court ruling unless they were sure of overwhelming political support in doing so, as was the case when Roosevelt stood up to the Lochner era reasoning of the US Supreme Court. 68 However, to the extent that is true -which given the pre-election commitment of the Conservative Party to repeal the HRA is perhaps With regard to the first concern, the doctrine of 'implied repeal', courts have always assumed that in the absence of an explicit repeal of, or challenge to, prior legislation, then it is reasonable to suppose that Parliament wished to legislate in a way that was compatible with existing law. As a result, they have interpreted all new laws `so far as it is possible' as if that were so. Moreover, under the HRA, the declaration of compatibility under section 19
gives the courts explicit grounds for holding that view. Of course, where they find legislation to be 'incompatible' they now have to say so explicitly. The second concern appears more problematic, for it involves the fear that section 3
(1) will lead the courts to depart from the conventional meaning of the legislative text in ways that had previously been deemed inappropriate, thereby challenging the rights-based judgments of Parliament. Yet, here too the departure from traditional forms of` `statutory interpretation' may be less than is assumed, with judicial discretion in certain respects reduced rather than increased. Some commentators make it seem that any failure not to follow the literal letter of the law must involve the undermining of legislative supremacy and with it political constitutionalism. 75 However, as I noted in section 1, it has always been the case that 'statutory interpretation' has involved courts in clarifying unclear or ambiguous terms, correcting drafting errors, and overcoming incoherent or unintelligible provisions that are irreconcilable with the rest of the statute. With the best will in the world, one cannot hope to eradicate all such linguistic problems. Nor can legislators be expected to foresee all the potential cases and circumstances their legislation may be applied to. As a result, they often use language, such as 'reasonable', and employ general rules rather than specific standards with the intention of giving judges a degree of discretion that will enable them to tailor legislation to the peculiarities and particular or special features of a given case. It would be impossible to rule out such discretion and replace it with a mechanical application of the law except in the crudest imaginable way, such as a two strikes and you're out rule, that excludes drawing the various distinctions between cases that are generally seen as necessary to avoid unjust and dysfunctional outcomes. 76 Any attempt to overcome this problem by writing all these distinctions into the law would necessarily give judges discretion to choose which ones applied. Even then, it would be hard to imagine that every eventuality could be anticipated.
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However, none of the above need mean judicial discretion is totally unconstrained.
Any type of constitutionalist must believe it possible for one reason or another that judges can be bound by law -at least in the sense that they feel an obligation to justify what they do 74 Bamforth,, supra note 28, xxxv-xxxvii. 75 Dyzenhaus supra note 64 has a tendency to slip into this view. by reference to it. A political constitutionalist need simply ask if it is possible to have a concept of law that conjoins Convention rights with parliamentary sovereignty in a coherent way that might constrain the sorts of legal reasons judges can offer for their decisions. In particular, can there be legal norms that constrain judges from simply interpreting the law so that it accords with an outcome that they personally believe best realises human rights in the case at hand. 78 I think a broadly legal positivist view, of the democratic kind outlined earlier, 79 holds there can be. 80 Both the HRA and the other pieces of legislation which are to be read alongside it have a common source that renders them legally valid -namely, Parliament. Therefore, the grounds of compatibility -or incompatibility -must be those stemming from this source within the legislation itself. Under section 19 Parliament will only have supplied a limited set of reasons for regarding a given piece of legislation as Convention compatible, or possibly none at all, and it is to these that the judge must defer. I shall call this a limitation of interpretative `scope'. Alongside it is a limitation of interpretative `sphere' that is related to the activity of judging itself. Judges have a legally constituted role. They are not armchair moral philosophers but sit in courts constituted by certain rules and procedures that they have a duty to oversee to ensure the trial is conducted fairly and provides justice for the litigant. These include such formal rule of law notions as treating like cases alike, acting impartially, ensuring all sides have an equal chance to present their case and so on. A political constitutionalist holds that it is appropriate for Parliament to decide general substantive issues of rights, and to offer legislative resolutions of the disagreements that attend them. However, that is compatible with regarding courts as entitled to ensure the procedures for passing the law were duly followed and that the judicial process remains fair when it comes to applying such rights in practice. The due process, particularly in the court room, is their domain, where they can legitimately claim more expertise and authority than Parliament.
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Naturally, there are discretionary elements in deciding how the law applies. My point is simply that these need not be arbitrary but legally sanctioned to be deployed with regard to a certain set of moral principles, those enumerated in the HRA, and in conformity with the 78 Obviously, saying that on this account of law judges would not be legally justified in deciding cases solely in this way is different to saying that it prevents them from doing sot in reality or denying that on occasion they might be morally bound to do so . 79 Following Waldron, supra note 24. 80 Natural lawyers, Dworkinian 'interpretative constructivists' and, though I think with less reason, legal realists will not find this account congenial, but theirs are not the only games in town. It suffices for my purposes to argue that a coherent account could be offered. 81 See Tomkins, supra note 58, 6. rationale of existing law (its `scope') and the norms of the judicial role (as applying to the `sphere' of the court and related procedural issues) -with a legal duty to say when these options cease to be at all plausible because further reasons are needed to resolve the case in a rights compatible fashion. To the extent such legal guidance has Parliament as its source, then it will not be the case that section 3 (1) HRA undermines the very notion of parliamentary sovereignty by offering a distinct moral test for the existence of law. 82 Indeed,
as Sandra Fredman has suggested, 83 the HRA arguably strengthens Parliament in this regard because it directs judges to be guided in their decisions not by vague, permissive social sources of morality -such as notions of 'natural justice' or an apparently ever expandable 'common law' -but by a specific and democratically enacted list of rights. In fact, the court has consistently argued that their post-HRA rights-based review of legislation has legitimacy because it accords with the express will of Parliament that they interpret the law with regard to these norms. 84 In itself, however, simply listing a certain set of rights will not be enough to constrain judicial discretion. For these rights still allow for pretty broad and widely differing interpretations, and it is the basic claim of political constitutionalists that a democratically elected legislature ought to be ultimately responsible for justifying which interpretation applies in legislation. The notions of 'scope' and 'sphere' enter here, offering crucial guidelines. The one constrains the allowable breadth of legislative interpretation to those purposes proposed by, or that can be plausibly attributed to, Parliament -the implications of which for rights are now spelled out under section 19, the other the domain where judicial independence holds sway.
By implication, these criteria also provide guidelines for addressing the third concern noted above. For, they can help determine when interpretation under section 3 should give way to a declaration of incompatibility under section 4: namely, on those occasions where the court cannot render the law compatible with its reading of Convention rights within the judicial 'sphere' without going beyond or altering the 'scope' of the legislation, thereby trespassing on the legislative 'sphere' that properly belongs to Parliament. Crucially, this division of labour also relates to the application of the doctrine of proportionality, which has 82 Note, I am adopting an 'exclusive' rather than 'inclusive' form of legal positivism here. I am not saying the incorporation of moral principles into the law make them criteria of legal validity, but rather that they are legally valid to the extent they have been incorporated into law by Parliament. 83 provision' that evidence necessary to make the trial compatible with Article 6 ECHR was admissible. However, this 'reading in' goes beyond the removal of a linguistic confusion or error of the kind adverted to above. As such, it appears to trespass on the 'scope' of the legislation, given that there can be no doubting that Parliament had sought to block the use of the very evidence the court now sought to allow. That said, the heart of the case was a `sphere' that could be regarded as rightfully that of the judiciary: namely, the fair conduct of a trial. The difficulty lay in the court's being unable to rectify its perception that injustice might arise in this 'sphere' without altering the 'scope' of the legislation. True, the court did attempt to justify its decision by arguing that the 'reading in' was to give effect to what it believed was the main purpose of the legislation: namely, to ensure rape trials were not biased. The court claimed this case had merely revealed that in particular circumstanceseither unanticipated or not fully considered by the legislature -the laudable desire to protect the rights of complainants found in the express wording of the statute had undermined its central 'implicit' purpose by jeopardizing the equally compelling rights of defendants.. So, it could be said the court's argument was that their decision had the limited `scope' of better realising the legislature's purpose, in a `sphere' where they possessed a competence that has always been reserved to them, and doing so in terms that the legislature had itself ordained in the HRA. Certainly, it is significant that the court felt it necessary to legitimatise itself in this
way. other pre-HRA cases in order to reflect changes in social morality. 95 Here, the passage of the Civil Partnership Bill through Parliament at the time of the case, which would prevent future discrimination against same sex couples, and the fact the government did not contest the case, further reinforced the acceptability of seeing the interpretation as being compatible in scope with Parliament's underlying purpose. This approach conforms to a standard pattern within the HRA case law, whereby even if courts depart from the enacted intention of Parliament found in the express terms of a statute, they will refer to its unenacted legislative purpose and the more general Parliamentary intention that they use 3 (1) to make legislation Convention compatible. As such, their interpretations remain consistent with political constitutionalism. 96 It might be objected that even so Ghaidan involved sufficient creativity with regard to the reinterpretation of 'scope' as to render a declaration of incompatibility more appropriate. .
The contrast with Bellinger -a case involving the recognition of a marriage by a transsexual woman as valid, where a declaration of incompatibility was issued -proves instructive in this regard. 97 Here, the government had accepted a recent ECtHR decision holding the UK to be in breach for Articles 8 and 12 for denying legal recognition of gender reassignment; 98 was exploring the many issues to do with its recognition that went beyond the case; and had announced new legislation would be available offering a remedy to the plaintiff. As a result, The HRA contains a number of explicit provisions designed to protect Parliamentary sovereignty and the UK's political constitution. Legal constitutionalists have argued not only that these provisions ought not to apply -that they are illegitimate and in certain ways unconstitutional, but also that they are implausible and impossible to operate in practice. My prime aim has not been to show that they do operate, so much as that they could. As I noted, legal constitutionalist critics of parliamentary sovereignty regard the court's deference to this doctrine with great scepticism -as either deluded or purely formal and possibly cynical. 103 It is sometimes assumed that political constitutionalists embrace a similar scepticism regarding notions of rights, the rule of law or judicial impartiality. However, at its heart political constitutionalism can be regarded as providing a defence against just such scepticism.
On the one hand, political constitutionalism offers a way of identifying law and explaining its authority by associating its source in a democratically elected legislature. 104 On this account, the assurance we have that law reflects our interests and secures our rights and that we have good reason to obey it come from its being promulgated and debated by our representatives. Far from being sceptical of rights or law, political constitutionalists defend both. They merely regard the legislature as the most appropriate forum for seeing rights in the round and ensuring their specification in legislation takes into account the full range of considerations necessary to promote the public interest. They also see the need for a large number of accountable representatives to agree on a settled law as a means for preventing arbitrary rule by any one person or persons.
On the other hand, that does not involve any scepticism about courts -merely that legislation and adjudication involve different qualities. Judges have responsibility for and expertise in issues of fair process that form part of their 'sphere' and in assuring the law is appropriate to its 'scope' or purpose with regard to a given litigant. These are issues that cannot be fully addressed at the legislative level, which is too remote from the peculiar circumstances that surround a particular case. But by the same token, courts are in their nature too narrow in focus and as forums to deal adequately with the issue of deciding a collective policy on rights that looks at the myriad ways different rights interact. They lack the informational and legitimacy advantages that come from decision-making by large numbers of representatives responsive to the views of millions of electors. The HRA arguably should be read as reinforcing both these features of political constitutionalism. Section 19 and the processes that have developed around it reinforce the conscientiousness with which Parliament deliberates about rights. Section 3 (1) reinforces the rights-based aspects of adjudication. However, courts also have the ability to further reinforce Parliament's responsibilities through section 4 -using this both to signal when they feel Parliament might, in the light of a given case, be advised to think again, or where they believe the executive may have overstepped their authority and should be subjected to further parliamentary scrutiny.
The division of labour here accords with that Locke gave for moving from the state of nature to civil society and that lies at the heart of the 'separation of powers' that he first began to theorise. Namely, that civil society provides the lack of a known and settled law Constitution remaining true to its history in successfully combining both the separation of powers and a bill of rights not despite but because of parliamentary sovereignty.
